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Abstract. In this position paper we argue that aspects are well-
suited to describe and implement a range of strategies to make
secure JavaScript-based applications. To this end, we review major
categories of approaches to make client-side applications secure
and discuss uses of aspects that exist for some of them. We also
propose aspect-based techniques for the categories that have not
yet been studied. We give examples of applications where aspects
are useful as a general means to flexibly express and implement
security policies for JavaScript.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.3.3 [Programming Lan-
guages]: Language Constructs and Features; D.4.6 [Operating
Systems]: Security and Protection—Access controls, Information
flow controls
Keywords Aspect-Oriented Programming, Web Application Se-
curity, JavaScript
1. Introduction
As the usage of JavaScript to provide a richer web experience for
websites grows, so does the concern about the security guarantees
these websites provide. The static web pages of the past have turned
into full-fledged web applications: collections of HTML pages
including CSS and JavaScript files to provide a user experience
nearing those usually associated with so-called native software.
Consequently, web applications are increasingly complex, hence
prone to the design flaws and programming errors found in their
native cousins. These defects can range from mere nuisances to
critical security vulnerabilities, especially as web applications rely
on ever-evolving standards, heterogeneous running platforms, and a
dynamic scripting language with reflection capabilities but lacking
proper isolation mechanisms.
Since security is a crosscutting concern of many applications,
its definition and implementation is often aptly expressed using
Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP). Using AOP, security con-
cerns can be factorized and cleanly separated from the core logic
of the application; thus making secure applications easier to write,
comprehend, maintain and extend. Furthermore, aspects are well-
suited to the dynamic nature of JavaScript, from the analysis of
running programs to the dynamic definition of security policies.
Applications of AOP to security are neither novel nor exclusive
to JavaScript; several approaches have targeted Java for example
[Copyright notice will appear here once ’preprint’ option is removed.]
(see Toledo et al. [22] and its references). However, the peculiarities
of the JavaScript language and the complex ecosystem of web
browsers and web standards altogether present a new, and largely
unexplored, challenge to AOP.
Our primary goal is the expression of security policies for web
application using AOP. Following Groef et al. [9], we consider
three large categories of security properties and corresponding
techniques for JavaScript-based web applications: fine-grained ac-
cess control, capability-secure scripting and dynamic information
flow. In the first section, we show how aspects and aspects-like
techniques are already employed by access control mechanisms.
These successes give credence to the relevance of AOP for Java-
Script security, and for the other two categories in particular. In the
following two sections, we show how they can be tackled using
aspects. We then discuss the use of AOP to secure web applications
from a higher viewpoint.
2. Fine-grained access control
The arguably most basic level of web application security is access
control: authorizing scripts for execution.
At the coarsest level, access control prevents a whole script from
executing on the basis of its origin. The same-origin policy [27]
and the Content Security Policy [19] header are two examples
from this category. The CSP header complements the same-origin
policy with a whitelist of allowed origins for web content: images,
fonts, styles, and more importantly scripts. While effective against
most forms of content injection attacks such as cross-site scripting
(XSS), this coarse-grained policy is also inherently heavy-handed.
Indeed, if the content origin is the only criterion for security,
neutralized content could actually be harmless, while authorized
content could be compromised after the definition of the content
policy, and thus could contain potentially dangerous code. To pre-
vent these scenarios from happening, more flexibility is required
when including a script in a web application; the application devel-
oper could disable only a subset of the functionality provided by
an included script, in order to prevent common attack vectors (e.g.,
by restricting uses of eval) or information leaks (e.g., by filtering
calls to XMLHttpRequest). That way, even scripts from trusted ori-
gins would be prevented from using unsafe language constructs or
calling privacy-sensitive functions.
Fine-grained access control mechanisms precisely aim to pro-
vide flexible security policies to web application developers. On the
other hand, due to the dynamic nature of JavaScript, fine-grained
access control mechanisms have to rely, partly at least, on the run-
time observation and manipulation of executed scripts. This run-
time monitoring of an existing script for security purposes is ad-
vantageously expressed using AOP [24, 25]. Prior work such as
ConScript [15], WebJail [2], Phung et al. [17] and ZAC [20] is a
testament to the relevance of AOP in the context of JavaScript ac-
cess control.
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around(document.createElement,
function (c : K, tag : U) {
let elt : U = uCall(document, c, tag);
if (elt.nodeName == "IFRAME")
throw 'err';
else
return elt;
});
Figure 1. An advice to the function document.createElement
in ConScript that throws an exception when the resulting element
is an IFRAME (taken from [15]).
We can divide these results depending on whether aspects are
deployed at the system level, within the browser to alter JavaScript
interpretation, or at the application level.
2.1 Aspects in the browser
In ConScript [15], security policies imposed upon included scripts
are expressed as aspects. Each aspect can enforce very specific and
dynamic security restrictions to the application. For example, in
Figure 1, an aspect is defined around calls to the DOM function
document.createElement in order to prevent the creation of
IFRAME elements. Since JavaScript lacks a static type system,
such restrictions have to be enforced at runtime; and these are
conveniently expressed using aspects.
WebJail [2] also uses aspects for advising native functions. Here
however, security policies are not directly expressed as aspects, but
as JSON configuration files. WebJail then uses these JSON policies
to build the corresponding advices. Here, aspects are not exposed to
the developer of the web application, but they are still an important
part of the security mechanism.
Both ConScript and WebJail apply aspects to the JavaScript
interpreter embedded in the browser. A pointer to an advice is
added to the memory representation of each JavaScript function,
native or created by user scripts. Implementing aspects at this level
in the browser has strong benefits. Firstly, the runtime performance
penalty is low (between 1 and 7% in this case) when compared
to rewriting techniques (30% and up). Secondly, securing policy
advices is easier, since they can be separated from potentially
malicious user scripts. Nevertheless, the main drawback of this
implementation scheme is its specificity: ConScript targets only
Internet Explorer 8, and using it requires a modified version of that
browser. The same can be said for WebJail, which is specific to
Mozilla Firefox 4.
2.2 Aspects in the application
Instead of implementing aspects at the browser level, an alternative
is to provide the aspect weaver as a separate script. Lightweight
self-protecting JavaScript (LSP) [17] and ZAC [20] are two such
approaches: written in JavaScript and executed as any included
script. Consequently, they are portable; any browser capable of
executing JavaScript can use them.
Like ConScript, LSP and ZAC express security policies as as-
pects. LSP aims to be a simple lightweight reference monitor,
whereas ZAC is built upon AspectScript [21], a library that rewrites
JavaScript code to allow aspects to capture all operations (func-
tion calls, property reads and writes, assignments, etc.). Rewriting
scripts incurs a strong performance penalty, because all the code
is wrapped-up for monitoring. The benefit of rewriting is that As-
pectScript provides ZAC with a finer granularity for security poli-
cies than any of the previously presented methods.
ZAC.R_EVAL = {
rule: function (event) {
return event.isCall() && event.fun === eval;
},
action: function (event) {
try {
return JSON.parse(event.args[0]);
}
catch (e) {
throw "Use eval only to parse JSON objects";
}
}};
Figure 2. A security policy written as an aspect in ZAC. Calls to
eval are allowed only when the argument is a string serializing a
JSON object (taken from [20]).
3. Capabilities-based security
Capabilities provide a quite different security model than mecha-
nisms based on access control and information flow. Capabilities
are a language-level mechanism that cannot be forged and directly
serves as a proxy for resource accesses. Capabilities, for exam-
ple objects as capabilities in OO languages, enable certain security
properties, such as isolation properties, to be implemented easily
and naturally in programming language terms.
However, most existing OO languages do not provide capabil-
ities themselves, in particular, because of the multiple means they
provide for access to many resources. Restrictions on those lan-
guages are often used to define capability-safe subsets and thus
provide a capability-based programming model that is similar to
that of mainstream languages, In the following we first provide an
overview of (categories of) the restrictions that are necessary to
provide capability-safe subsets for JavaScript and Java, briefly in-
troduce capability-based enforcement of security properties, and,
finally, show that aspects can be employed to define capabilities
and corresponding security properties.
3.1 Capability-safe JavaScript and Java
Objects in standard OO languages do not constitute capabilities per
se. Based on analyses for the case of Java (the Joe-E system [14])
the following underlying categories of issues can be distinguished,
see Fig. 3: forging of references has to be avoided or arbitrary ob-
jects can be turned into capabilities; capabilities must not be leaked
or arbitrary users may obtain capabilities; every access has to be
mediated through capabilities and capabilities must be strongly en-
capsulated; otherwise access may be obtained without sufficient au-
thority.
JavaScript (as analyzed for the standard ECMAScript 3 as part
of the Caja system [16]), for example, is subject to all of these is-
sues: the global environment may be accessed in many different
ways without passing through a representing object; state can only
be encapsulated using a limited notion of lexical scope and implic-
itly mutable state can be used to break encapsulation and propa-
gate references in unexpected ways; references may also change
due to the dynamic contexts in which functions are called due to
the complex semantic rules governing this. All of these features
of JavaScript, among others, break capability safety.
Figure 4 shows three concrete examples of capability violations
in JavaScript. The first illustrates a facet of the semantics of this:
in two very similar contexts, this is interpreted very differently. In
the second line, this denotes a function but in the third line this
allows direct access to the global scope of the JavaScript program.
The next two examples illustrate cases from popular JavaScript-
based systems, AdSafe and (now retired) Facebook JavaScript, in
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Issue JavaScript (examples) Java (examples)
Forge references Implicit mutable state, this semantics Native methods
Prop. refs unexpectedly Global env., unconstrained properties Mutable exception throwables
Access res. w/o mediation Global env., implicitly mutable state Subclassable static fields, lib. func.
Break encapsulation Implicit mutable state, limited lexical scope Reflection API, catch Errors
Figure 3. Capability-breaking language issues.
// 1) Thorny semantics of `this`
(x.m)(...) // x.m function: this bound to x
(true && x.m)(...) // this bound to global scope
// 2) Example from the AdSafe library:
// ephemeral provides access to global object;
// enables alerts
var a = dom.tag("div").ephemeral;
var asd = a().alert("Hacked!");
// 3) example from the FBJS library
// Storing a DOM element yields access to
// foreign-owned documents
var a = dom.text(["hacked"]);
a[0].ownerDocument.location="http://attacker.com";
Figure 4. JavaScript capability violations (taken from [13, 16]).
which a reference to specific library objects requiring low authority
allow access to completely different objects that should require
high authority.
Enforcing security properties using capabilities. A capability-
safe language allows several security properties to be enforced in
a direct manner: isolation of resource access, for example, can
be enforced by assigning disjoint sets of capabilities to different
principals. Maffeis et al. [13] define the notion of authority safety
as ensuring that an access to a resource is either granted to a
principal initially or explicitly handed to that principal by another
authorized one. More generally, capabilities support patterns for
secure programming: by encapsulating and providing interfaces to
sets of capabilities, access to resources can be flexibly managed.
3.2 Aspect-based security with capabilities
In the context of capability-based security, aspects can be used for
two purposes:
i. to define capabilities, i.e., ensuring capability-safety in a lan-
guage that is not safe by itself; and
ii. to ensure security properties on top of capabilities provided by
a capability-safe language.
Defining capabilities. Aspects can be used to enforce capability-
defining restrictions on the semantics of Java and JavaScript. For
example, the JavaScript subset of Caja [16] is defined in terms of
static transformations and runtime checks. Many of the static trans-
formations do not correspond, however, to the static part of aspect
systems, in particular, that of AspectJ. Most of the restrictions thus
have to be implemented using aspect-based runtime checks. The
JavaScript problems shown in Fig. 3 can be handled directly: ac-
cesses to the global environment and mutable state can be guarded
using aspects; the different semantics of this can be identified and
handled according to context; the scoping rules of JavaScript are
essentially dynamic, and can also be restricted using aspects.
In order to make this discussion more concrete, reconsider the
capability violations in Fig. 4. All three violations can be handled
x = false;
y = false;
if (document.cookie == "abc") {
x = true;
} else {
y = true;
}
if (!x) {
// leaked info: cookie != "abc"
}
if (!y) {
// leaked info: cookie == "abc"
}
Figure 5. Attack using implicit flows (taken from [23]).
using aspects: concerning violation 1, the expression in line 3 can
be blocked or the usage of this monitored later on in order to avoid
access to global objects through this. In the case of the two latter
examples, aspects can easily be used to suppress the leakage of high
authority references through the names dom.tag[].ephemeral
and dom.text.
Enforcing security. Aspects are also well-suited to support se-
curity properties that are defined based on capabilities. Authority
safety [13] has been implemented for a subset of JavaScript using
two rewrite rules, one for property accesses e1[e2] and one for
this [13], and three initialization rules; all of these rules can be
implemented simply using aspects. Finally, the enforcement of pro-
gramming patterns is a standard application of aspects and can be
applied straightforwardly to the patterns for secure programming
mentioned above.
4. Information Flow
As a third approach to security, information flow mechanisms track
the flow of information through an application and, basically, guar-
antee that no confidential information leaks and prevent the injec-
tion of untrusted data. Enforcing these properties with static anal-
ysis has been extensively studied [18]. Static analysis has the ad-
vantage that it makes it possible to reason about non-interference,
a property stating that confidential data has no influence on pub-
lic outputs. Dynamic analysis is weaker in that it can only reason
on the current execution. Typically, it makes it easy to track ex-
plicit data flows, which occur via assignments. However, in that
case, non-interference is not guaranteed. For instance, in Fig. 5, it
is possible to track that the document cookie is confidential and
therefore that, depending on the branch taken by the execution, ei-
ther x or y carries confidential information. But the other variable
remains public and can be used to leak information. Implicit data
flows, due to conditionals, can still be taken into account, and non-
interference guaranteed, by conservatively blocking the execution
when a public variable is updated in a confidential context [3]. In
our example, this policy would block the execution on updating x
or y within the conditional testing the document cookie. Finally,
information flow, including non-interference, can be tracked using
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secure multi-execution (SME) [8]. This consists of running multi-
ple copies of the application, one at each confidentiality level, with
rules for input and output operations in order to coordinate the ex-
ecutions.
4.1 JavaScript Information Flow
Due to the highly dynamic nature of JavaScript, resorting only to
static analysis is hardly feasible. However, practical proposals deal-
ing with some form of non-interference, such as [23] and [7], are
hybrid in order to deal with implicit flows. In Staged Information
Flow [7], static analysis is performed prior to program execution
based on a security policy expressed as sets of pairs (x, •) or (•, x)
meaning that the value of the variable x should not flow to or from
a “hole” (a dynamically loaded script). When the analysis cannot
conclude, it returns a simple residual policy, expressed as a set of
variables that should not be read or written by the hole, a purely
syntactic check that is then performed at runtime. On the opposite,
the analyses of [23] are performed at runtime and the system is
driven by the dynamic analysis. Forgetting about non-interference,
BFlow is purely dynamic [26]. It tracks explicit information flows
between protection zones (sets of frames) with the help of a ref-
erence monitor implemented as a Firefox plugin. BFlow is how-
ever limited by its coarse-grained nature: a single untrusted browser
frame cannot at the same time handle confidential and public data.
All these proposals consider either a full version of JavaScript, e.g.,
including eval, or are very close to it. They are all able to capture
significant instances of problematic cross-site scripting.
SME has been, from the beginning, studied in the context of
JavaScript. FlowFox [10], for example, does not multi-execute the
web browser as, in that case, enforcement would take place at the
OS API level, which turns out to be too coarse-grained. It rather
multi-executes the scripts with enforcement taking place at the
browser API level. Interactions with the DOM, considered as I/O,
can thus be tracked.
Finally, Austin and Flanagan have improved on their initial
work on guaranteeing non-interference with dynamic analysis [4,
5]. In particular, [5] makes the link between dynamic analysis and
SME through the notion of faceted values. Instead of equipping
each value with a confidentiality label, each value has a facet value
corresponding to a confidentiality level, for instance, a private value
and a public value if there are only two levels. This makes it
possible to simulate SME within a single execution.
4.2 Aspectizing JavaScript Information Flow
In principle, aspects are well-suited to implement dynamic analy-
ses either by applying aspects to the program to be analyzed or by
applying aspects to the corresponding language interpreter. AOP
has, for instance, been applied with some success to profiling [6]
and runtime verification [1]. However, different domains have dif-
ferent needs, in particular in terms of the join-point model and,
unfortunately, tracking information flows requires to operate at a
granularity level not covered by our off-the-shelf weaver for Java-
Script, AspectScript. For instance, tracking explicit flows requires
to capture assignments but also arithmetic and logical operations.
AspectScript captures the former but not the latter. Typically, the
result of an arithmetic or logical operation is confidential if one of
its arguments is confidential. In this case, capturing read operations
is enough but the weaver must be instructed to do so. Alternatively,
each operation can be turned into a function – an overkill if this
has to be done systematically. We have also seen above that rea-
soning on conditional statements was necessary whereas there are
no join points attached to conditional statements. This situation is
not essentially different from the one of AspectJ, which has led to
the introduction of new join points such as loop join points [11].
Another interesting issue is the interplay between static and dy-
namic analysis and modifying the browser versus modifying the
application. Modifying an actual browser for tracking information
flows is often described as a challenging task that requires to “in-
strument” various parts of the browser. This suggests that it makes
sense to study the design and implementation of browsers using as-
pects but also that wiring this facility within the browser makes it
difficult to compile it away when static analysis allows it. This is-
sue does not exist when information flow tracking is directly woven
into scripts. Static analysis can then be used to control weaving or
even been considered, at least conceptually, as a result of partially
evaluating weaving [12].
5. Discussion
Throughout this study, we have shown useful applications of as-
pects for securing JavaScript-based web applications. There are
some interesting uses of aspects for access control but they have not
been considered yet within the two other categories. Furthermore, a
comprehensive strategy for secure software systems needs to con-
sider different security properties. Techniques to support combina-
tions of security properties of different categories, for example for
access control and information flow, are therefore of interest but
have not been studied at all until now.
Aspects are well-suited to provide a general framework for
the declarative expression and efficient implementation of flexible
security policies for JavaScript. Specifically, we envision
i. a high-level, possibly aspect-based, domain-specific language
for the declarative definition of security policies and properties;
ii. flexible implementation and tool support for dynamic analysis
and rewriting that may advise, for instance, constructs at run-
time in a scope of any depth;
iii. explicit support for interactions between aspects to resolve is-
sues of precedence and specificity among security aspects.
Our study suggests that security is an interesting testbed for
(and probably strongly benefits from) advanced mechanisms in
AOP such as history-based pointcuts, execution levels, and scoping
strategies.
Performance is also an important issue when considering practi-
cal applications. To mitigate the costs of rewriting, we can sacrifice
portability and alter the JavaScript interpreter instead. Another gain
could be achieved by increasing the portion of static computation,
at the cost of runtime flexibility; hot-swapping of security policies,
for example, can be harnessed.
Eventually, there is the looming matter of validating aspect-
based security policies: ensuring they are effective and without
unintended side-effects. Existing formal frameworks for JavaScript
security should thus be integrated with aspect formalisms.
6. Conclusion
To summarize, we reviewed major categories of approaches to
secure JavaScript-based client-side applications. We first discussed
uses of aspects (and their limitations) that exist for some of them.
Then, we outlined the use of aspects for categories where aspects
have not yet been studied. We provided concrete examples of the
usefulness of aspects as a general means to flexibly express and
implement security policies for JavaScript.
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